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We have built an imaging system that uses a photon’s position or time-of-flight infor-
mation to image an object, while using the photon’s polarization for security. This
ability allows us to obtain an image which is secure against an attack in which the
object being imaged intercepts and resends the imaging photons with modified infor-
mation. Popularly known as “jamming,” this type of attack is commonly directed at
active imaging systems such as radar. In order to jam our imaging system, the object
must disturb the delicate quantum state of the imaging photons, thus introducing
statistical errors that reveal its activity.
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Recent advances in quantum mechanics have enabled many enhanced imaging technologies1,2.
Entangled photon-number (N00N) states3 have allowed Heisenberg-limited phase measure-
ment and led to the development of LIDAR systems with quantum-enhanced resolution4.
Even without the use of entanglement, the sensitivity of optical ranging and pointing sys-
tems has been improved beyond the classical limit by the use of quantum resources5–7. In
this letter, we propose and demonstrate a quantum enhancement to optical ranging and
imaging systems that will make them secure against intercept-resend jamming attacks. A
common concern for active imaging systems today is the threat of jamming, where extra-
neous or false information is sent to the receiver in order to fool it8. More sophisticated
methods of jamming are being developed which allow the imaging signal to be intercepted,
manipulated, and resent9. This allows the object being imaged to bely its actual position
or velocity, or even create a false target10. By using quantum states of light modulated
in polarization in an imaging system, we can provide security against such methods of
jamming. Quantum-secured sensing based on similar principles has previously been demon-
strated for the purpose of sensing intruders by using entanglement11 and interaction-free
measurements12.
Our secure imaging technique is based on a modified version of the BB84 protocol of
quantum key distribution (QKD)13. Instead of an eavesdropper (Eve) located between the
sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob), we now have a jamming object (Jim) at one end and
Alice and Bob at the other (Fig. 1). By virtue of being in the same location, Alice and
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FIG. 1. A sketch showing the fundamental difference between the quantum key distribution (QKD)
and quantum-secured imaging (QSI) protocols. In QKD, a spatially separated sender and receiver
use quantum mechanical principles to securely share information. In QSI, a collocated sender and
receiver use shared information to securely query an object.
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Bob already share information. Instead, they now use this information to securely query
Jim by encoding it in the polarization of a stream of photons. This leaves the position and
time degrees of freedom of the photons free for the purpose of obtaining an image of Jim.
If Jim were to try to jam this system by intercepting and resending the photons with false
position or time information, he will introduce statistical errors in the polarization encoding
that will give away his jamming attempt. As in QKD, security is guaranteed due to Jim’s
inability to measure a photon simultaneously in two conjugate polarization bases.
Studies of eavesdropping in QKD14,15 attempt to answer the question: what is the max-
imum error rate detected by Bob that will allow the extraction of secure information after
error correction and privacy amplification? To jam our secure imaging protocol, the jam-
ming object, Jim, must perfectly replicate our entire querying signal in order to resend it
with false position or time information. This simplifies the above question to: what is the
minimum error rate introduced by Jim in trying to copy a secure QKD transmission between
Alice and Bob? Using the intercept-resend quantum eavesdropping strategy16,17, Jim can
pick two orthogonal polarization bases to eavesdrop in. His error rate is then equal to:
eJ(θ) =
1
4
[
(1− cos 2θ) + (1− sin 2θ)] (1)
where θ is the angle between the preparation basis used by Alice and the eavesdropping basis.
Jim’s error rate (eJ) is minimized to 14.64% when θ = 22.5
◦ (referred to as the Breidbart
basis18). However, Bob’s error rate (eB) is independent of the jamming basis angle used and
is minimized to 25% as long as Jim always resends in the eavesdropping basis16:
eB(θ) =
1
4
[
(1− cos2 2θ) + (1− sin2 2θ)] = 25%. (2)
We use this error rate as our secure image error bound. If Bob’s received signal has an error
rate less than 25%, images obtained from it can be considered secure against intercept-resend
jamming attacks. Images obtained from a signal with an error rate greater than 25% cannot
be considered secure and imply that Jim was actively jamming the channel. This can be
interpreted as a reduction in Alice and Bob’s mutual information, which is related to Bob’s
error rate as:
IAB = 1 + (1− eB) log2(1− eB) + eBlog2(eB). (3)
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FIG. 2. Schematic of our quantum-secured imaging experiment. Polarized single-photon pulses
from a HeNe laser are reflected from the object and imaged onto an electron-multiplying camera
(EMCCD) through an interference filter (IF). A half-wave plate (HWP) and a polarizing beam-
splitter (PBS) are used to make the appropriate polarization basis measurement. Four images
corresponding to the four measured polarizations are obtained. The angle of reflection is exagger-
ated in the figure for clarity but is less than 5◦ in reality. The object consists of a reflective stealth
aircraft silhouette.
For our imaging protocol to be secure, Alice and Bob’s mutual information after querying
Jim must be at least 0.1887 bit/photon. In a protocol with no error, their mutual information
stays at its maximum value of 1 bit/photon.
In our proof-of-principle experiment, we use polarization-modulated photons to securely
image an object in reflection (Fig. 2). A HeNe laser is intensity modulated by an acousto-
optic modulator (AOM) to create pulses with one detected photon on average. A half-wave
plate (HWPa) mounted on a motorized rotation stage randomly switches the polarization
state of the photon among horizontal, vertical, diagonal, and anti-diagonal (|H〉, |V 〉, |D〉,
and |A〉). The single-photon pulses are incident on the object, which consists of a stealth
aircraft silhouette on a mirror. They are then specularly reflected from the object towards
our detection system. In Fig. 2, we show a non-zero reflectance angle for clarity. An
interference filter (IF) is used to eliminate the background. A second rotating half-wave plate
(HWPb) and a polarizing beam-splitter (PBSb) carry out the appropriate basis measurement.
When the axis of HWPb is parallel or at 22.5
◦ to the H direction, the measurement is carried
out in the horizontal-vertical (H/V ) or diagonal-anti-diagonal (D/A) basis respectively. If
an |H〉 or |V 〉 photon is sent, the measurement on the received photon is always carried out
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FIG. 3. Laboratory demonstration of quantum-secured imaging. (a) When there is no jamming
attack, the received image faithfully reproduces the actual object, which is shown in the inset. (b)
In the presence of an intercept-resend jamming attack, the received image is the “spoof” image of a
bird. However, the imaging system can always detect the presence of the jamming attack, because
of the large error rate in the received polarization. In (a) the error rate is 0.84%, while in (b) it is
50.44%. A detected error rate of > 25% indicates that the image received has been compromised.
in the H/V basis, and similarly for the D/A basis. This removes the need for sifting bases
between sent and received photons. Two lenses are used after the PBS to create four images
corresponding to the four measured polarizations on an electron-multiplying CCD camera
(EMCCD), which serves as a single-photon detector.
In Fig. 3(a), we show an image of the stealth aircraft object obtained by this system. The
image is obtained by taking 10,000 images containing one detected photon each on average,
for random orientations of HWPa and HWPb. The final image is constructed by combining
the four polarization images formed on the EMCCD, shown in Fig. 4(a). The different
pixel colors correspond to the different measured polarizations. An error corresponds to the
case when a received photon is detected in the opposite polarization to that it was sent
in. For example, if an |H〉 photon is sent to the object and a click is obtained in the |V 〉
image, it counts as an error. For the case when there is no jamming attack, we expect an
error-free image. However, some error is obtained due to imperfections in the PBS, and is
in agreement with the measured PBS efficiencies. The measured average error of 0.84% is
well below our error bound of 25%, indicating a secure image. Using Eq. 3, we see that
the imaging system’s mutual information is reduced to 0.93 bit/photon, which is above the
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FIG. 4. The received image is comprised of four different images corresponding to the four measured
polarizations (H,V,D, and A). (a) When there is no jamming attack, the four images have a near-
zero error in the received polarization. (b) In the presence of an intercept-resend jamming attack
in which the object resends only H-polarized photons, the four images have considerable error in
the received polarization. This measured error allow Alice and Bob to determine that the imaging
system was being actively jammed. There is no V image obtained in this case as the measurement
of an |H〉 photon in the HV basis leads to no V signal.
threshold value of 0.1887 bit/photon.
We simulate an intercept-resend jamming attack on our system by intercepting the imag-
ing photons at the object, and resending them with a “spoof” image of a bird. For simplicity,
we resend all the photons in a horizontal polarization. Fig. 3(b) shows the received image
in this case. The presence of the jamming attack is detected by measuring the error in each
received polarization. Measurements of an |H〉 photon in the D/A basis give an average
error of 50%. Measurements of an |H〉 photon in the H/V basis always appear in the H
channel. Thus, when a |V 〉 photon is expected, there is a 100% error. When an |H〉 pho-
ton is expected, no error is obtained. These error probabilities give an average expected
error of 50%. Our measured error of 50.44% closely matches this result and indicates that
the received image has been compromised. Also, the system’s mutual information is re-
duced to near-zero, further verifying an intercept-resend jamming attack. We show the four
polarization images and their measured errors in polarization in Fig. 4(b).
While we have performed secure imaging using a photon’s position information, it is
easy to extend this idea to a photon’s time-of-flight information. In addition, one can use
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FIG. 5. Schematic for a proposed secure time-of-flight experiment, based on the entanglement-
based Ekert QKD protocol. Polarization-entangled photon pairs generated in a pair of crossed
PPKTP crystals are used to measure the distance to an object. Security against an intercept-resend
jamming attack is checked by carrying out a test for a CHSH Bell inequality with measurements
in appropriate polarization bases using Pockels cells (PC) and polarizing beam-splitters (PBS).
the entanglement-based Ekert protocol for security. In Fig. 5 we propose a schematic for
an entanglement-based secure optical ranging experiment. A pulsed laser incident on a
pair of crossed periodically poled potassium titanyl phosphate crystals (PPKTP) creates
pulses with one pair of polarization-entangled photons on average, in the state (|H1H2〉 +
|V1V2〉)/
√
2. Using an appropriately oriented Pockels cell (PC), a PBS, and two avalanche
photodiodes (APDs), these photons are measured in the rotated polarization basis |H ′〉 +
|V ′〉, where |H ′〉 = sin θ |V 〉 + cos θ |H〉 and |V ′〉 = cos θ |V 〉 − sin θ |H〉. One photon from
the polarization-entangled pair is immediately measured by PCa, PBSa, APD1, and APD2
in one of two rotated polarization bases with θ = 0◦ and 45◦. The other photon travels to
the object and is reflected back to the source, where it is measured by PCb, PBSb, APD3,
and APD4 in one of two rotated polarization bases with θ = 22.5
◦ and −22.5◦. For each
pulse, coincidence timing measurements between APDs1,2 and APDs3,4 are used to calculate
the CHSH Bell inequality parameter S19,20, as well as the distance to, or velocity of the
object. If the calculated CHSH parameter meets the condition |S| > 2, the optical ranging
measurement can be considered secure against an intercept-resend jamming attack. Such
a technique would greatly enhance the security of photon-counting optical ranging systems
being developed today21,22.
In conclusion, we have implemented an active imaging scheme that uses quantum me-
7
chanical principles to ensure security against intercept-resend jamming attacks. We have
also proposed a quantum-secured optical ranging technique. We should point out that our
proposed schemes have certain limitations. Our experimental implementation used weak
coherent pulses, which makes it susceptible to a photon-number splitting attack, where the
jammer splits one or more photons from pulses containing more than one photon23. This
would allow the jammer to measure these photons in both polarization bases and perfectly
replicate the querying pulses. It may be possible to use decoy states to defeat such an attack,
as has been demonstrated in QKD24. Further, a sophisticated jammer may use quantum
teleportation25 to teleport the polarization state of our querying photons onto photons car-
rying false position or time information. In practice, however, this would prove extremely
challenging, as quantum teleportation involves Bell state measurements, which can only
be performed probabilistically in a linear optical scheme11. Finally, our protocol does not
provide security against attacks that preserve a photon’s polarization state. For example,
metamaterials26 and slow-light techniques27 can be used to hide an object in space and time
without disturbing the polarization of any querying photons. However, these methods are
currently in their infancy and only work in extremely limiting cases. On the other hand,
given the current state of QKD technology28,29, our quantum-secured protocol can easily be
realized and integrated into modern optical ranging and imaging systems. Also, the possi-
bility of using other degrees of freedom of a photon such as its orbital angular momentum
in a quantum-secured channel30 may open up exciting avenues for future research.
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